The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right
Questions?
Modern Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons

Jim Hawley and Jon Lukomnik*
The heavy shadow of modern portfolio theory (MPT) has had a
massive impact on everything from market structure, investment
philosophy, and investor behavior, to the research that examines those
disciplines. Researchers believe that they are casting light onto investment
issues (including, for this purpose, specifically investor time horizons), but
generalized acceptance of MPT allows it to continue to darken what should
be enlightened.
As a result, we contend that investors and researchers (both
practitioners and academics) focus on and measure the wrong time frames.
MPT focuses investment activity towards alpha-seeking activity and index
replication, rather than trying to improve beta. We use beta in this context
to mean the risk and return of the market as a whole, not a specific stock’s
volatility in relation to market volatility. Beta, which is the systemic or
non-diversifiable risk of a portfolio, is widely regarded—wrongly—as
exogenous and rarely impacted by portfolio investment. As a result,
research into investor time horizons primarily examines trading time
frames around security or asset selection whose purpose is to seek alpha
and/or diversify idiosyncratic risk, rather than examine the time and level
of exposure to beta, or to impact beta, even though that is more impactful
and explanatory. In addition, investors tend towards thinking of
themselves and acting as if they have shorter investment horizons than
they do in reality, partially because of MPT’s (and the asset management
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industry’s) focus on security selection and alpha-seeking, and partially
because of systemic hyper-discounting.1
The contextual argument is this: MPT, as practiced, views systemic
risk and return (beta or in the jargon of the investor, “the market”) as
exogenous to, and not impacted by, investor decisions and behavior, either
by one market actor or by implication (though usually unwritten and
typically not considered) groups of market actors. MPT accepts that some
risks are systemic and non-diversifiable: Those are the risks that contribute
to beta. Those risks can be financial (e.g., global financial crisis),
environmental (e.g., climate change), or social (e.g., income inequality or
political stability), but the focus of MPT is to create an efficient meanvariance portfolio within that systematic risk framework by diversifying
idiosyncratic risk (or as alpha seekers do, by seeking some idiosyncratic
risks and avoiding others). The remaining systemic risk constitutes beta,
and the investor is exposed to it. There is no consideration that investment
decisions themselves—whether intentionally or accidentally—can affect
systemic risk.
It is a central point of our argument that while some risks are
systemic and non-diversifiable, that does not suggest that they are immune
from mitigation. They can be addressed in a number of ways, which we
discuss below. Indeed, the fact that these risks are not diversifiable should
increase the urgency and rationale of addressing them directly but not
through directly buying and selling securities.
Investors, in mainstream MPT thinking, either focus on the search
for alpha or, in attempting to maximally diversify idiosyncratic risk, gain
exposure to beta through passive investment.
Contrary to that mainstream view, we assert that there are feedback
loops between portfolio investment and the environmental, social, and
financial systems;2 thus, investors can and do affect beta. However,
researchers’ analyses rarely focus on how portfolio investment affects beta
and focus even less frequently on the time to impact beta since
traditionalists continue to view beta as exogenous to portfolio investment
decisions. We suggest that this perspective has everything to do with the
misunderstanding of investors’ actual time horizons.

1. Andrew G. Haldane & Richard Davies, The Short Long, Speech Before the 29th Société
Universitaire Européene de Recherches Financières Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money and
Finance? (May 2011), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/
2011/speech495.pdf [https://perma.cc/37BC-7WAN].
2. See generally William Burckart et al., Tipping Points 2016: Summary of 50 Asset Owners’
and Managers’ Approaches to Investing in Global Systems, IRRC INST. (Nov. 7, 2016), https://
irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/TIIP-and-IRRCi_State-of-Industry_Nov-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CJV9-82HA].
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Specifically, we make six relevant observations about MPT, which
provide context for—and a direct challenge to—how we measure
investors’ time horizons:
1. MPT has become a victim of its own success given the
institutional ownership revolution in the last forty years;
2. Portfolio investment, whether active alpha-seeking or passive
beta-matching, can impact systemic risk, changing beta. In other words,
systemic risk (and therefore beta) is not exogenous to portfolio investment;
3. Alpha and beta are not distinct and disjointed but intimately linked
along a continuum of market recognition and acceptance.
4. MPT has focused on alpha-seeking as a way to extract value,
leading to increased short-term (i.e., “the long short”) trading activity,
even though seeking a “better beta” might be a more impactful way to
create value, both in terms of portfolio returns and the economy as a whole.
Ironically, MPT has created the intellectual and practical framework for
indexation, but as most indexes are capitalization-weighted-based, alphaseeking investors thus have a tendency to wag the passive beta dog;
5. The alpha–beta dynamic tends to speed up time frames
irrationally;
6. The prior five observations lead us to a crucial observation: There
is a need for better measures of time frames. Those metrics should be
designed for a purpose rather than be a “one metric measures all”
investment objective. They should be designed specifically to measure
time horizons for alpha-seeking investors and beta-exposure investors and
for measuring the time of the feedback loop between portfolio investment
and beta.
Observation 1: MPT and the Ownership Revolution
Fundamentally, nothing less than an equity ownership revolution
(and indeed an investing revolution across most all asset classes) has
changed capital markets since the 1950s when Markowitz first developed
MPT.3 Institutions owned about 8% of the U.S. equity market in the
1950s.4 Today, they own more than 78% in the United States (and higher
in some countries).5 This is a game changer. But MPT, investment’s
guiding light, has not adequately understood the implications of the
3. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
4. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech to Georgia State University,
J. Mack Robinson College of Business (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013spch041913laahtm [https://perma.cc/S657-SWGL].
5. Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INV. (Apr. 25,
2017), http://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-marketcap-held-by-institutions [http://perma.cc/Y5K6-H3B5].
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radically changed market structure, which is somewhat a result of its
success. Ironically, while indicative of MPT dominance, the concentration
of ownership within large institutions has the seeds of proving central parts
of MPT flawed.
In a fragmented ownership market dominated by individual
ownership, such as the one Markowitz observed in 1952, MPT functioned
in a decentralized manner. A plethora of decision-makers made individual
decisions about individual securities. There were no large index funds and
no exchange-traded funds. There were few large investors at all. As a
result, any systemic impacts of any specific investor’s investment
decisions, or even a group of investors’ decisions, were imperceptible. Let
us call this the gravity conundrum. You and I have a gravitational effect
on the moon. When we walk across the room, we affect the moon’s orbit.
But, with the possible exception of theoretical geophysicists, no one cares
or notices. It is simply too small to measure or to even take into account.
And, of course, various people are walking in various directions all over
the world at any one time, largely canceling out each other’s tiny lunar
impact. That was the equivalent of Markowitz’s world in 1952. No
investor or group of investors was large enough to affect beta in an
observable manner.
Compare that to the current U.S. market with its huge concentration
of institutional equity ownership. The top five owners of any individual
company (e.g., BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, etc.) often own
upwards of 15% of equity, while the top twenty-five institutions can own
upwards of 50%.6
Observation 2: Portfolio Investment: Whether Alpha-Seeking or
Passive Beta-Matching Can Impact Systemic Risk, Thereby Changing
Beta.
As a result, there is a set of powerful institutions controlling a large
portion of the market, unlike the decentralized market of Markowitz’s
time. At the same time, MPT drives these owners’ investment decisions to
become radically centralized, often resulting in de facto “super portfolios,”
which result in the co-movement of numbers of portfolios in the same
direction; they are linked by investment philosophy and technique (MPT)
to respond similarly—if not identically—to various indicators and
developments.7
6. Aguilar, supra note 4.
7. Jeffrey Wurgler, On the Economic Consequences of Index-Linked Investing (Nat’l Bureau
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16376, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16376.
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As an example of how this occurs and the effects of the phenomenon,
consider the growth of index funds, which now account for more than one
third of the U.S. stock market by capitalization.8 Passive investing through
index funds does not try to “beat the market” but to match it, at least as
measured by popular indices such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000.
Conceptually, MPT provides a powerful rationale for passive
investing. Capitalization-weighted indices are supposed to represent the
cumulative “wisdom” of “the market,” the result of thousands, or even
millions, of independent investment decisions. This is, effectively, the
efficient market hypothesis at work.
It certainly is true that indexation and passive investing have brought
material benefits to investors by allowing low-cost diversified exposure to
what is, in theory, the market’s best estimate of the most efficient meanvariance portfolio. But, indexation is also an important example of MPT
not recognizing how investors’ decisions, amplified by the growth of large
institutional investors and by MPT’s own institutional and ideological
success, can affect beta.
One of the dynamics of this nonrecognition is the super-portfolio
phenomenon. Wurgler shows that indexed-based investing strategies and
products have risen rapidly over the last few decades.9 However, the
efficient market view, as MacKenzie puts it, seems to have created an
anomaly itself as index members are subject to an evident mispricing.
Indices have become so popular that their members’ price movements are
not entirely due to new information around the underlying securities
comprising the index (either individually or cumulatively); rather, the
market demand for investing in the indices themselves can move them
independently.10
Wurgler counts two impacts that index inclusion brings for a stock.
The first is initial inclusion impact; the second is the continuation in
inclusion impact.11 The increase in price followed by the inclusion of a
stock in a major index is not the result of new information about the stock’s
value (fundamentals) but a result of index inclusion causing the increase
in demand for that stock by investors. This impact is documented in
several studies.12
Wurgler argues that the mispricing is not limited to the time of
inclusion. After inclusion stocks start co-moving with other index
8. Madison Marriage, Passive Funds Take Third of US Market, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/4cdf2f88-7695-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35.
9. Id.
10. DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE
MARKETS 259 (2006).
11. Wurgler, supra note 7.
12. Tracking Error, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trackingerror.asp.
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participants, index members, resultantly, can start slowly drifting away
from the rest of the market. This phenomenon has an important and real
implication for the market. As fund managers face the pressure of
evaluation based on a benchmark, or chasing an index return, the resultant
growth in demand to include an index in their portfolio creates a feedback
loop that exacerbates index members’ detachment from the rest of the
market. Therefore, rather than be a representative of a market, an index (to
the degree that it is adopted and mirrored by others) can become a superportfolio whose movement is not related to the fundamentals and,
therefore, exposes its holders (and others) to an enormous systematic risk.
Sullivan and Xiong also find that the growth of indexation has
affected equity market risk: “Such trading commonality then gives way to
a rise in systematic fluctuations in overall demand, which, in turn, leads to
a fundamental impact on the overall market and investors’ portfolios. In
short, the growth in trading of passively managed equity indices
corresponds to a rise in systematic market risk.”13
The super-portfolio effect affects non-index, or fundamental, active
equity managers as well; they do not want to be left behind. Such managers
often have tracking error targets; they seek returns within a predetermined
performance range of the chosen index benchmark.14 To do that, they
carefully understand their underweight and overweight stock selections
relative to the index. While most understand that this means they often
hold index component stocks as tracking error risk control mechanisms,
few make the link back to MPT. These investors are not making
fundamental decisions but are buying or selling merely to control risk
against an index, which MPT theorizes is supposed to represent the
wisdom of the market, which further amplifies Wurgler’s index effects and
begins the cycle anew.
In effect, MPT’s goal of an efficient mean-variance portfolio,
combined with the underlying efficient market hypothesis and
operationalized by the ability to create index funds, creates an MPT
tautology: The capital linked to the index itself becomes the justification
for the index being efficient, thus attracting more capital.
13. Rodney N. Sullivan & James X. Xiong, How Index Trading Increases Market Vulnerability,
68 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 70, 82 (2012).
14. For a general discussion of benchmarks, see David Blake & Allan Timmermann,
Performance Benchmarks for Institutional Investors: Measuring, Monitoring and Modifying
Investment Behaviour, in PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN FINANCE: FIRMS, FUNDS AND MANAGERS
108, 108–41 (John Knight & Stephen Satchell eds., 2002). For a discussion of extreme examples of
how “active managers” pay such close attention to the index that they become “closet indexers,” see
Mathieu Caquineau, Watch Out for Closet Index Funds, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 11, 2016, 10:14 AM),
http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/147931/watch-out-for-closet-index-funds.aspx.
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Other studies also support the idea that index inclusion in and of itself
can have fundamental impacts, even beyond market price, on the
individual companies that comprise the index. For instance, Appel,
Gormley, and Keim demonstrate that index inclusion results in
fundamental corporate governance changes at the company due to a
change in share ownership to large, institutional investors, such as
Vanguard and Blackrock, which have specific governance preferences.15
Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner note that index inclusion can drive a
reduction in research and development expenses at companies because
new investors are perceived to have short-term horizons.16
Of course, amidst all this index effect and price movement, the
ultimate irony is that if everyone accepted MPT’s cogent argument for
passive investment vehicles and the efficient market and indexed their
investments, there would be no individual stock selection decisions and,
therefore, no price discovery, leading to a frozen market with no price
movement. Thankfully, even with one third of the market linked to
indices,17 that remains a theoretical rather than a practical issue. But, it
does suggest that the more there is a switch from individual decisionmakers creating mean-variance efficient portfolios to passive investors
and super-portfolios effects, the less resistance there will be to the index
effects.
However, a more recent market development, the rise in popularity
of exchange-traded funds (ETFs),18 demonstrates that this may not be that
theoretical of a concern, at least in some niche parts of the market. While
ETFs are technically a market structure, not an investment methodology
or vehicle, the preponderance are passive, designed to track an index.
While some track broad market indices, many track sector indices. Like
the broad market indices, those sector indices are often capitalizationweighted, consistent with MPT and the efficient market hypothesis. Many,
if not most, of the investors in ETFs regard those indices as “the market”
for that sector of the market, or at least as the metric that measures the risk
and return of the beta of “the market.” But, as we know, ETFs do not track
their underlying components under a number of conditions.19
15. Ian Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2016).
16. Martijn Cremers et al., Short-Term Institutions, Analyst Recommendations, and Mispricing
20 (Mar. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2190437&rec=1&srcabs=2285470&alg=1&pos=8.
17. Marriage, supra note 8.
18. Valarie Chaille, ETFs Are Getting More Popular—and More Complex, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
20, 2015, 10:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/etfs-are-getting-more-popularand-more-complex1442800945.
19. Gerasimon G. Rompotis, Predictable Patterns in ETFs’ Return and Tracking Error, 28
STUDIES ECON. & FIN. 14 (2011); Sangheon Shin & Gökçe Soydemir, Exchange-Traded Funds,
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The narrower investment universe represented by the sector indices
means that the impact of investors’ portfolio decisions is less diluted. To
put another way, the “index effect” is more noticeable; it functions as an
index multiplier. As the ETF grows, relative to the index, the tension
grows. Consider, for example, the recent decision by VanEck to change
the index of its VanEck Junior Gold Miners ETF (GDXJ).20 From 2016 to
2017, the ETF grew its assets from slightly more than $1 billion to $5.4
billion. The index tracked focused on smaller gold mining stocks, but the
rapid growth in assets meant it was unable to invest solely in the stocks in
the index without falling afoul of various market regulations, such as the
Canadian rules that would require it to make a takeover offer for a
company if it owned more than 20% of its shares.21 The solution is to
change the index to include larger capitalization companies.22 In this case,
investors wanted the systemic risk of smaller gold mining stocks. But, by
buying in bulk, they changed the ability to invest in smaller companies,
forcing the ETF to go up the capitalization rankings, thereby changing the
beta of the ETF.
In sum, MPT provides the intellectual underpinning of indexation but
never considers that widespread adoption of indexation could have
systemic impacts. Most MPT practitioners and other analysts regard beta
as exogenous; MPT theory just does not consider that portfolio
investments and beta are linked into a feedback loop.23 Reality has no such
constraints.
Observation 3: Alpha and Beta Are Not Distinct and Disjoint but
Are Intimately Linked Along a Continuum of Market Recognition and
Acceptance.
The logical extension of the idea that portfolio investments affect
beta is that, contrary to accepted MPT precepts, alpha and beta are not
Persistence in Tracking Errors and Information Dissemination, 20 J. MULTINAT’L FIN. MGMT. 214
(2010); Ayan Bhattacharya & Maureen O’Hara, Can ETFs Increase Market Fragility? Effect of
Information Linkages in ETF Markets (Sept. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2740699.
20. Co-author Jon Lukomnik is a trustee on the board of affiliated VanEck funds.
21. Sumit Roy, How an ETF Gets Too Big for Its Index, ETF.COM (Apr. 10, 2017),
http://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/how-etf-gets-too-big-its-index?nopaging=1 [https://
perma.cc/2WLQ-T6ZX].
22. See Sumit Roy, Popular Gold Miner ETF to Change Dramatically, ETF.COM (Apr. 17,
2017), http://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/popular-gold-miners-etf-change-dramatically
[https://perma.cc/84UV-2BEY].
23. See generally THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (Tessa Hebb et
al. eds., 2016).
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disjoint but rather a bit like conjoined twins: When one moves in certain
ways, it can impact the other. It is a two-way street, symbiotic and
dialectic. This conceptualization challenges MPT’s fundamental belief
that beta is fixed and exogenous to a portfolio and that one can only create
positive or negative alpha, as opposed to affecting the market’s beta.
An important recent example of this is the attention paid to
environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) factors in
investing. Indeed, there has been significant attention paid by practitioners
and academics as to whether alpha can be found in ESG factors.24 An
increasing number of robust studies using a variety of datasets and
methods suggest: Yes, it can be (using traditional MPT definitions).25
Various uses of ESG factors, for example, from factor exposure tilts to
short-term ESG momentum portfolios that focus on improvement in ESG
ratings, have outperformed various traditional benchmarks in the last ten
or so years.26 Recently, a number of influential studies focused on
Sustainability Accountings Standard Board (SASB) defined materiality
aspects of ESG for specific sectors and found potential fundamental
reasons for this outperformance. For example, the cost of capital—
whether debt or equity—is lower for firms with strong materiality in E
and/or S and/or G factors.27 “To the degree that real-world benefit enables
such firms to outperform various benchmarks an ESG alpha may be
embedded in their valuation.”28 In theory, this cost of capital advantage
exists because it “is not widely recognized and may be ‘found’ by early
movers.”29

24. See TruValue Labs, 10 Studies That Show How and Why ESG Investing Works, THOMSON
REUTERS (July 10, 2017), http://lipperalpha.financial.thomsonreuters.com/2017/07/10-studies-thatshow-how-and-why-esg-investing-works/ [https://perma.cc/47RV-9EBV].
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Remy Briand, Can ESG Add Alpha?, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/www/blogposts/can-esg-add-alpha-/0182820893 [https://perma.cc/F242-MTVB]; Linda-Eling Lee, Can ESG
Add Alpha?, FACTSET (Sept. 10, 2015), https://insight.factset.com/can-esg-add-alpha#.
V5pt55ODGko [https://perma.cc/HYX5-ZNTD].
27. See Mozaffar N. Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-073, 2015), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/
1/14369106/15-073.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/W4UN-7F5K]; The Financial and Societal
Benefits of ESG Integration: Focus on Materiality, CALVERT (Jan. 3, 2017),
https://www.calvert.com/calvert-serafeim-series-report-materiality.php
[https://perma.cc/WU62SFZ6]; Emily Kaiser et al., The Role of the Corporation in Society: Implications for Investors,
CALVERT
(Sept.
2015),
https://www.calvert.com/includes/loadDocument.php?embed&fn=
24319.pdf&dt=fundPDFs [https://perma.cc/C2RT-XUMK].
28. James Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Alpha-Bet(a) Soup: What to Make of Alpha Seeking
and ESG?, MEDIUM BLOG (Aug. 23, 2016), https://blog.insight360.io/the-alpha-bet-a-soup-what-tomake-of-alpha-seeking-and-esg-5df59f272503 [https://perma.cc/727L-BRBA].
29. Id.
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Ironically, traditional market theory suggests that the early-mover
source of alpha will eventually be arbitraged away.
Thus, while the cost of capital may provide a source of
“alpha” for early adopters, over time it should become
part of the systemic factors that determine the “beta” of
the market. In other words, to the degree that over time
ESG factor out-performance is recognized by the larger
market alpha fades (it regresses to the mean), and ESG’s
systemic impact becomes embedded in equity (and bond)
pricing, meaning it becomes part of market beta.30
At a minimum, it becomes recognized as a systemic risk or source of
“alternative beta” much the same way that capitalization range (i.e., small
cap v. large cap), style (i.e., value, growth), illiquidity, and other factors
have moved from sources of alpha for those early adopters who recognized
them, to systemic risk exposures as they have become widely recognized
by the majority of investment capital.31
Similarly, while we currently consider ESG-tilts (such as ESG
“smart beta” strategies) and ESG-momentum strategies as sources of
alpha, they are actually systemic. How soon until ESG factors are also
considered systemic risks incorporated into beta, rather than non-systemic
alpha generators? Likely sooner than later: “smart ESG beta” is
transitional to ESG becoming embedded in the market. As the more than
half a million internet citations for the phrases “alternative beta” and
“smart beta” suggest, this realization is becoming widespread.32 Indeed,
there is now an “ESG Beta Quality Fund” ETF,33 an early indication that
this transformation from alpha to beta has already begun.
The existence of “smart/alternative beta” or “factor” impact is a
major challenge to the traditional framework of MPT, as it suggests that
alpha and beta are intimately linked in a host of ways. One way to view
beta is as the sum of market participants’ internalization of the expected
returns and expected risks (and correlations) of all the securities in the
marketplace. Therefore, the more the distinguishing factors of any security
or set of securities are recognized by the participants, the more those
factors become part of market beta. The less recognized, the more those
factors can be considered alpha. Unless one postulates that market
30. Id.
31. See generally Pursue Investment Outcomes with Factors, BLACKROCK, https://www.
blackrock.com/investing/investment-ideas/what-is-factor-investing [https://perma.cc/8Q7N-KR5V].
32. Google search performed on June 26, 2017.
33. PAX ESG Beta Quality Fund, PAX WORLD MGMT., http://paxworld.com/funds/pax-esg-betaquality-fund/ [https://perma.cc/C6RY-HJSV].
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participants all reach the same analytical conclusions instantaneously, and
thus, the factor under analysis switches from alpha to beta instantaneously,
then alpha and beta are actually on a continuum, with the point on the
continuum determined by the amount of market capital that considers
those factors. That continuum continuously changes over time, as those
factors wax and wane in acceptance.
Some practitioners do intuitively understand the feedback
mechanisms between alpha and beta. These investors practice what we
term “intentional beta activism” in an attempt to change the
undiversifiable systemic risk of the market.34
Remember the gravitational conundrum? Today’s investors are large
enough to affect beta directly.35
The New York City proxy access initiative demonstrates the
gravitational force that a single large investor can have.36 Proxy access is
a technical procedure that makes it easier and less costly for investors to
place their nominees for a company’s board of directors directly onto the
company’s election ballot, in certain circumstances.37 While that right
exists in various forms as a matter of law in various jurisdictions, it does
not in the United States.38 Proxy access in the United States must be
adopted by each firm, and firms can legally refuse to do so.39 As a result,
until very recently virtually no public companies allowed proxy access.
However, in 2014, New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer, on behalf
of the City’s pension funds with assets of some $175 billion, decided to
change that and sponsored proxy proposals at seventy-five large U.S.
public companies to force them to adopt proxy access.40 He followed up
in 2015 and 2016 with more proposals and has announced that the

34. See James Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, RI Quarterly: Beyond Modern Portfolio Theory–How
Investors Can Mitigate Systemic Risk Through the Portfolio, PRI, https://www.unpri.org/page/riquarterly-beyond-modern-portfolio-theory-how-investors-can-mitigate-systemic-risk-through-theportfolio [https://perma.cc/C6RY-HJSV].
35. Certainly, there were influential investors who moved markets, even in Markowitz’s time,
but the mechanism was information and influence, not size. So, MPT was able to consider these
market-moving events “new information,” which fit nicely into the efficient market hypothesis that
underlies much of MPT.
36. Boardroom Accountability Project 2.0, OFF. N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, https://comptroller.
nyc.gov/services/financial-matters/boardroom-accountability-project/overview/
[https://perma.cc/
AKC7-YXGP].
37. See id.
38. See Kobi Kastiel, Proxy Access, SEC Uncertainty and Related Issues in 2015, HARV. L. SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2015/02/24/proxy-access-sec-uncertainty-and-related-issues-in-2015/
[https://perma.cc/9BA9DMAQ].
39. See id.
40. See supra note 36.
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campaign will continue this year.41 As of 2017, more than half of S&P 500
companies have adopted proxy access, and most observers think the trend
is for further adoptions and for proxy access to spread to smaller
companies.42 The New York City proxy access initiative is an attempt at
beta activism, changing market standards and therefore beta—not just
changing a particular company.
Even certain governance actions directed in a single firm or a small
set of firms to improve governance (or E and S factors) may be beta
activism if, as former CalPERS CEO Dale Hansen once said, it “moves
the herd.”43 That is, the way you herd cattle is to move the outliers into the
center, thereby changing the herd’s direction. For markets, the same holds:
Beta activism can define acceptable behavior as well as what the market
considers relevant (material) factors, as Hawley has discussed in several
blogs.44
The signaling effect of beta activism can even affect such sources of
non-diversifiable systemic risk as political risk and regulation. Consider,
for example, how CalPERS changed a nation’s financial regulation. In
2002, the pension fund announced that the laws governing investment into
the Philippines were not adequate and that it would therefore pull its
investments in that country’s stock market.45 The Manila index declined
3.3% in a day.46 The Philippine government sent a delegation to
Sacramento to meet with CalPERS and within two years announced
changes to its laws and regulations sufficient to reverse CalPERS’s

41. Id.
42. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN (June
28,
2016),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Shareholder-ProposalDevelopments-2016-Proxy-Season.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHS9-VF9N].
43. See generally James P. Hawley, Political Voice, Fiduciary Activism, and the Institutional
Ownership of U.S. Corporations: The Role of Public and Noncorporate Pension Funds, 38 SOC.
PERSP. 415 (1995).
44. ESG Materiality Without (Comparable) Metrics? Back to the Future of Financial
Reporting?, TRUVALUE LABS (Apr. 11, 2016), https://blog.insight360.io/esg-materiality-withoutcomparable-metrics-back-to-the-future-of-financial-reporting-fda6d1349c00#.hb43h6cxi
[https://
perma.cc/28H3-3K2W?type=image]; Fiduciary Duty & ESG: Why Materiality Matters, TRUVALUE
LABS (May 13, 2016), https://blog.insight360.io/fiduciary-duty-esg-why-materiality-matters81fe84d00912#.p9nvn34g1 [https://perma.cc/2ZWE-9XAY]; Is ‘Materiality’ in the Eye of the
Beholder? (Part I), TRUVALUE LABS (Feb. 25, 2016), https://blog.insight360.io/is-materiality-in-theeye-of-the-beholder-part-i-199399441f0#.43w13n4nq
[https://perma.cc/UPA3-9T3W];
Is
‘Materiality’ in the Eye of the Beholder? (Part II), TRUVALUE LABS (Mar. 3, 2016), https://
blog.insight360.io/is-materiality-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder-part-ii-57ac2843736#.q9tilbl0v [https://
perma.cc/LQS4-P8T8].
45. STEPHEN DAVIS ET AL., THE NEW CAPITALISTS: HOW CITIZEN INVESTORS ARE RESHAPING
THE CORPORATE AGENDA 9 (2006).
46. Id.
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boycott decision.47 CalPERS directly affected the beta of the Philippine
market, but also its systemic health.
Looked at through that analytical lens, recent activity by various
investors represents a plethora of attempts at beta activism and some at
changing systemic risk, or put positively and normatively, improving
system health. Some of the investors undertaking them are large enough
to act on their own, such as the efforts of Larry Fink, CEO of Blackrock—
the world’s largest investor, with $4.6 trillion under management—to
encourage public companies to invest for long-term revenue and
productivity growth.48
It is not an accident that the examples above include two of the
largest pension funds in the world and the largest asset manager. There are
costs to beta activism and attempting to ensure system health. Those costs
are borne by the investors taking action, but the benefits are market-wide
(since they are systemic), leading some to eschew those efforts because of
a “free rider” issue.49 Moreover, the gravitational conundrum suggests that
more assets are more effective at affecting beta and systems.
However, the free rider issue experienced by large beta activists can
be, and is, partially offset as various types of coalitions composed of
smaller investors are formed to lower the cost collective actions. Ceres in
the United States and Hermes in the United Kingdom have long organized
groups of smaller funds to act together, thereby both mobilizing funds that
otherwise would not be able to act individually due to high costs.50
Additionally, such coalitions reduce the free rider effects for the largest
beta activist funds, but of course, come nowhere near eliminating them.
Increasingly, institutional investors are coming to understand that to
be an effective beta activist you need significant assets under management
(either individually or collectively, as in the Hermes and Ceres examples),
and the more the better. Thus, coalitions of some of the largest investors
are also forming. At least in theory, that should minimize the cost to any
individual institution, somewhat mitigating the free rider issue, while
making the activism more effective.
47. Id.
48. Matt Turner, Here Is the Letter the World's Largest Investor, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink,
Just Sent to CEOs Everywhere, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/
blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-letter-to-sp-500-ceos-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/5S55-BWW3].
49. This is similar to the issue of alpha activism, which activist hedge funds have dealt with by
amassing outsized positions in the corporate targets of their activism. It does not eliminate the free
rider issue but does minimize it by allowing the hedge fund to capture more of the economic benefit
it hopes to create.
50. See generally Ceres Non-Profit Network Members, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/aboutus/ceres-coalition/members [https://perma.cc/K63K-2ZWM]; HERMES INV. MGMT., https://www.
hermes-investment.com/us/ [https://perma.cc/AV8F-76HD].
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For example, on January 31, 2017, sixteen large institutional
investors—with $17 trillion in assets under management—launched an
ambitious attempt at beta activism.51 These investors promulgated a
combined corporate governance and stewardship code to take effect on
January 1, 2018.52 The initial signatories included major asset managers
(BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors, Vanguard, and T. Rowe Price),
asset owners (the California State Teachers’ Retirement System and the
Florida State Board of Administration), and international institutions (GIC
Private Limited [Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Fund], PGGM [the second
largest pension fund in the Netherlands], and Royal Bank of Canada).53
Their intention to change beta is manifest; the second headline of the press
release announced the group was “[u]nveil[ing] [a] Framework of Guiding
Principles with Expectation of Long-Term Value Creation . . . .”54
The Investor Stewardship Group largely focused on the “G” of ESG,
but investor coalitions are not limited to only that focus. By contrast, Ceres
is an investor-led coalition which works on the “E” to, in its words,
engage and collaborate on environmental, social, and
governance issues to advance leading investment
practices, corporate engagement strategies and policy
solutions through working groups and shared learning
opportunities, such as webinars and events. Ceres works
with investors specifically to better manage carbon, water
and supply chain risks, and ramp up global investments in
clean energy and sustainable food and water systems.55
The need for large assets to move the market is manifest to Ceres;
one of its initiatives involves an investor-led coalition, the Investor
Network on Climate Risk, which features more than 130 institutional
investors with more than $17 trillion in assets, all of whom have pledged
to invest so as to affect the systemic risk of climate change.56 Some have
created low-carbon index funds; others have clean tech portfolios, and still
others engage with petrochemical companies over the risk of “stranded
51. Inv’r Stewardship Grp., Leading Investors Launch Historic Initiative Focused on U.S.
Institutional Investor Stewardship and Corporate Governance, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:26 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170131005949/en/Leading-Investors-Launch-HistoricInitiative-Focused-U.S. [https://perma.cc/6UKC-WBEL].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Ceres Investor Network on Climate Risk and Sustainability, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/
investor-network [https://perma.cc/FC8B-EUE6].
56. Id.

2018]

The Long and Short of It

463

assets” (carbon-based natural resources that may never be burned due to
climate impact).57 Read in terms of beta, this means making the market
recognize such factors as “material,” that is, necessary as value added for
a sustainable low carbon economy.58 In some ways, that fits into the MPT
construct as “new information,” but it is distinguished by being
information provided by investors and by the investors themselves
attempting to move markets through capital allocation. Such actions were
symbiotically related to a series of downgrades of coal companies by
Moody’s and Fitch in the fall of 2015.59
Turning to temporal issues, none of these initiatives show any
evidence of being time-limited. To the extent that they have time frames,
they are linked to the liabilities the investors are trying to offset; pension
funds have liabilities that are infinite if the fund remains open for
enrollment. BlackRock has often stated that, as the largest asset manager
in the world, it anticipates having market exposure forever,60 so the longterm health of the system matters to it. The coalitions see themselves as
trying to effect permanent change. The time horizon of any specific action
can be limited, but the impact of this type of beta activism is forever, in
that at least in theory, it seeks to change the systemic risk profile
permanently. As we will discuss in Observation 4, below, alpha-seeking
investors measuring relative returns over short periods appear to hyperdiscount future cash flows. Beta activists, however, appear to have a very
low discount rate indeed. As permanent market participants with continual
beta exposure, they see themselves benefiting from the changed systemic
risk profile forever. Thus, we do not believe that the holding periods
related to securities selection of these investors or groups of investors is at
all relevant to their goal of achieving a better beta.
While recent years have seen the partial beta activist mobilization of
large mutual funds (in the United States), this is overwhelmingly to date a
top-down activism, however important it is. At the level of many portfolio
managers within these huge firms, seeking alpha and beating benchmarks
57. Unburnable Carbon 2013: Wasted Capital and Stranded Assets, CARBON TRACKER
INITIATIVE (Apr. 2013), http://www.carbontracker.org/report/unburnable-carbon-wasted-capital-andstranded-assets/ [https://perma.cc/5G9X-T5TM].
58. Ceres Non-Profit Network, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/about-us/coalition [https://perma.
cc/K5K4-X6VV].
59. Fitch: Higher Default Rates Expected for US Coal Sector, FITCH RATINGS, INC. (Oct. 15,
2015, 12:37 PM), https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/992355 [http://perma.cc/367C-3L25]; Rating
Action: Moody's Downgrades Westmoreland Coal Company's CFR to Caa1; Outlook Stable,
MOODY'S INV. SERV. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgradesWestmoreland-Coal-Companys-CFR-to-Caa1-outlook-stable--PR_344844 [https://perma.cc/M35UNC97].
60. Michelle Edkins, Glob. Head of Inv. Stewardship, Blackrock, Statement at Council of
Institutional Investors Fall 2017 Conference (Sept. 14, 2017).
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still drive strategies and actions. This is also the case with the creation of
new ESG investment products, especially ETFs, which are typically
constructed and measured against benchmarks that by definition aim to
‘beat the market.’ The full integration of ESG into investment strategies
needs to involve a clear recognition that beta activism offers longer term
value creation than benchmarks to beat the market.
Observation 4: MPT Has Focused on Alpha-Seeking as the Way to
Create Value, Even Though Seeking a “Better Beta” Is More Impactful.
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) May Be a Better Metric than Holding
Periods and Turnover Rates.
Our contention that investors can affect beta is largely heterodox.
MPT emphasizes investors’ ability to seek alpha, not affect beta. Most
investors and observers judge skill by focusing on return versus
benchmark indices over various time periods; assets flow to managers who
“beat” their indices.61 Consultants present asset owners (both institutional
and retail) with reports showing their portfolio returns compared to
benchmarks, sorted by asset class or styles of management, typically on a
quarterly, one-, three-, and five-year basis.
There is a double irony in MPT’s massive conceptual influence. The
first, as above, is that while MPT provides the reasonable justification for
passive indexation, it simultaneously provides justification for active
managers to beat those indices and often on a very short-term metric (e.g.,
quarterly). There is of course a logic to this: price discovery is clearly
essential to all markets. Yet, by maintaining the absolute separation of
idiosyncratic and systemic risk, MPT a priori precludes consideration of
beta activism, including much that is by its nature long(er)-term.
The second, and we argue crucial, irony is that beta dwarfs alpha in
terms of total return effect. Brinson, Hood, and Beebower suggest that
more than 90% of the variation in return is explained by asset allocation,
not security selection.62 However, since MPT postulates that beta is a
given and cannot be affected by individual portfolio managers, it is logical
that investors would focus on what they can affect, namely alpha—hence,
the MPT alpha/beta paradox: MPT postulates that what you can affect
matters less than what you can’t.
61. MORNINGSTAR MANAGER RESEARCH, 2014 GLOBAL ASSET FLOWS REPORT 8–9 (2015),
http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/Commentary/2014%20Global%20Asset%20Flows%
20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/46VS-VGSG].
62. Gary P. Brinson et al., Determinants of Portfolio Performance, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb.
1995, at 133.
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The focus on alpha rather than beta results in pressure on active
managers to try to differentiate themselves through trading as a way to
seek alpha different than, and more positive than, other competing
managers. The measuring of returns versus indices over short-term periods
means that differentiation can occur over periods as short as one calendar
quarter.63 As one study demonstrated, the majority of money managers
trade more than they intend, even though “they were aware that excessive
turnover was potentially harmful to their clients.”64 “[E]xcessive trading
may be caused by the don’t just sit there, do something imperative. That
imperative states that portfolio managers and traders must do something
to justify their existence and compensation, even when doing nothing
might be the better choice.”65
The result has been well-documented: We have become a nation of
fairly short-term traders, rather than long-term investors, at least when it
comes to the public equity market. According to The World Bank, the
annual turnover of the U.S. public equity market increased from 19.6% in
1976 to 154.8% in 2016,66 meaning that an average investor will turn over
its portfolio entirely in less than eight months. Some would argue that data
is inflated because of high-frequency trading, but even alternative
measures of stock duration suggest that investors hold their specific
portfolios for little more than a year.67
What all these measures have in common is that they look at the rate
of change of specific stocks within an investor’s portfolio. That is not
surprising: Investigators are following the modus operandi of the industry
when they focus on the time frame surrounding trades rather than market
(beta) exposure over time.
Such trading also affects cap-weighted indices. At first you would
think that the growth in indexation is indicative of investors lengthening
time horizons and focusing on beta exposure. Yes, the growth in
indexation shows some material portion of the marketplace understands
(and has decided to stop playing) the short-term, beat-some-benchmark
game. Some proponents of MPT in fact argue this. However, looking
through the index fund to its holdings—the individual company stocks—
reveals that the only difference between index fund trading and
63. There has long been discussion as to what are the parameters of “short-term.” While often
quite involved, one indicator of “short-term” is that for three years there is a downside deviation from
the benchmark. This constitutes trouble for managers, who may see assets removed from them. But
note: this is a different dimension of “short-term” than holding or turnover periods.
64. Danyelle Guyatt & Jon Lukomnik, Does Portfolio Turnover Exceed Expectations?, 3
ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT. 40, 40 (2010).
65. Id. at 44.
66. Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%), WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR [https://perma.cc/Z6H6-YLSY].
67. Cremers et al., supra note 16.
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fundamental investor trading is that the index funds trade on autopilot
rather than by human or algorithmic decision-making. Their weightings
(other than changes to the index constituents by the index provider) are the
sum of the active, non-index, alpha-seeking market participants’ trades.
Given the market pressure to trade, cap-weighted passive portfolios reflect
this trading activity. There is a tendency for the alpha tail to wag the beta
dog.
Thus, the index investor is exposed to short-term, relative-return
thinking via the index construction rules that reflect the market’s trading
activity. Indeed, some have called capitalization-weighted indices covert
“momentum” style vehicles, as a price gain for a stock (disproportionate
to the rest of the index universe) increases its weight in the index.68 Capweighted indices are, effectively, price takers. If (too many) price makers
are short-term, then price takers/indices reflect this (and perhaps magnify
it due to the index effect). The irony here is that dedicated long-term
passive owners may own long-term, but do not determine or influence
capitalization of what they own. Short-term alpha-seeking sets the
parameters for these beta-trackers. From the market point of view, the
index investment does not offset short-term (relative return alpha trading)
but may, in fact, amplify it.
If it is market exposure that determines the vast majority of return
and risk, is the holding period of individual securities optimal in
determining how time frame affects risk and return? In effect, holding
periods (or their variants) measure the inputs into alpha-seeking activity
or the turnover in a portfolio but not the time dimension of beta exposure.
In fact, virtually all investors, whether alpha-seeking traders or betatracking ones, have permanent exposure to beta.69 It does not matter if
actively-managed mutual fund X has a one-day, one-month, or one-year
average holding period. Whatever dollar value of stock is sold will soon
be replaced with stock(s) that is bought. This series of sequential “alpha”
trades results in permanent beta exposure. But, of course, flows into the
fund will vary the amount of beta exposure as the individual account
holders put money into, or take money out of, the market. So, the mutual
fund may have effectively permanent beta exposure, but the individual
investors will experience a variance in their beta exposure.

68. See, e.g., Noel Amenc & Lionel Martellini, Alternatives to Cap-Weighted Indices, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/20d60b6c-f40c-11df-886b-00144feab49a [https://
perma.cc/946H-BFA7].
69. Whether high frequency traders are meaningfully exposed to beta (rather than arbitrageurs
of nano-second inefficiencies) is beyond the scope of this Article but is an important question.
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This is consistent with the academic and practitioner research that
beta exposure for an investor is different than the beta of the market as
typically measured. As long ago as 2004, Ilia Dichev noted that dollarweighted returns, which consider the timing of investment decisions, “are
systemically lower than buy-and-hold returns.”70 That difference was
1.3% annualized for NYSE/AMEX listed stocks from 1929–2002 and
1.5% annualized for nineteen international stock markets from 1973–
2004.71 Investors, it seems, tend to get in and out of the market, often at
the wrong times.
Notwithstanding that finding, asset management firms have
commercialized “tactical asset allocation” products that attempt to time
the market. Today, there are more than two-hundred long-only such funds
in the United States, which try to time the market.72
Thus far, the results have not demonstrated that “timing the market”
is a winning investment strategy. Indeed, one study suggested that not a
single one of the fifty-seven tactical asset allocation funds with a five-year
record ended July 2016 outperformed a passive 60% stock/40% bond
index.73
Other studies have suggested that a “cash drag” might be a primary
cause of why retail investors underperform mutual funds, which, in turn,
underperform the market.74 On average, retail investors hold 24% of their
portfolios in cash, and mutual funds hold 3.5% in cash. Cash, of course,
decreases equity market exposure but has no effect on security selection.
So, all other things being equal, cash would hinder returns in an up market
and benefit investors in a down market. Perhaps what is needed is not the
time horizon or holding period of a trade measure but a dollar-weighted
holding period of underinvestment (or, in the case of a leveraged investor,
overinvestment) metric.
In other words, temporal measures need to be combined with a
quantitative measure of “how much” is being affected by that time
measure. What these studies suggest, when looked at cumulatively, is that
at a minimum, we need to dollar-weight investors’ returns as well as the
70. Ilia D. Dichev, What are Stock Investors’ Actual Historical Returns? Evidence from DollarWeighted Returns 2 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=544142.
71. Id.
72. Tactical Allocation: Total Returns, MORNINGSTAR, http://news.morningstar.com/fundcategory-returns/tactical-allocation/$FOCA$TV.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
73. Luke F. Delorme, How “Tactical Allocation” Mutual Funds Fared Over the Last Five Years,
ADVISOR PERSP. (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2016/08/09/howtactical-allocation-mutual-funds-fared-over-the-last-five-years [https://perma.cc/35JM-X2QQ].
74. Cullen Roche, Why Do Retail Investors Underperform?, PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM (June 22,
2015), http://www.pragcap.com/why-do-retail-investors-underperform/ [https://perma.cc/KU5T44NY].
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benchmarks against which they are traditionally measured rather than just
time-weight them. So, we need to include time, alpha-seeking activity, and
beta impact. This moves us more towards a comparative Internal Rate of
Return (IRR) type of calculus than the traditional and simple timeweighted-return-versus-benchmark comparison.
There are investors who are exceptions to this semi-permanent
exposure to beta. Hedge funds can short stocks or baskets of stocks or even
the indices themselves, and so have variable exposure to beta. Indeed,
gross and net market exposures are standard risk measures for hedge fund
investors.75 Similarly, there are a series of long-flat indices that alternate
between market-level beta exposure and zero beta by converting market
securities to cash based on certain technical signals.76
But, the vast majority of investors hold primarily, if not exclusively,
long-only exposures, whether active or passive. The holding period that
matters for them is not the average of their trades at any point in time, but
the sum of their trades over time. Nonetheless, because of our MPT
mindset and worldview, we measure time frames wrong; or, more exactly,
we measure the wrong time frames. We measure them as holding periods
for individual trades (the inputs to seeking alpha) rather than the duration
of exposure to the market (beta) and with consideration of the amount of
beta exposure and alpha effect. For most investors, there is a large
difference between the duration of its beta exposure and the duration of its
individual trades. The former is far more important to long-term return.
Here is one other piece of evidence that the time frame of beta
exposure matters much more than any investor’s holding period or ex-ante
time
horizon
for
a
trade:
Time
Period
(Rolling,
19262014)
Best
Worst
Total
Spread

1 Year

3 Years

5 Years

10 Years

20 Years

166.9
(69.1)
236.0

42.1
(43.7)
85.8

35.6
(19.4)
55.0

21.5
(6.2)
27.7

18.4
1.2
17.2

75. See, e.g., Net Exposure, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/netexposure.asp [https://perma.cc/M75K-XH2V].
76. See, e.g., Morningstar Long Flat Commodity Index, MORNINGSTAR, http://www.
morningstar.com/invglossary/morningstar-long-flat-commodity-index.aspx [https://perma.cc/D5RLY88C].

2018]

The Long and Short of It

469

According to CRSP data, the best one-year U.S. stock market return
was 166.9%; the unfortunate investor who picked the worst year would
have lost 69.1%. The spread between those best and worst one-year
periods was 236%. However, time dampens volatility. The spread between
the best and worst three-, five-, ten-, and twenty-year rolling periods in
terms of annualized returns was 85.8%, 55.0%, 27.7% and 17.2%. In fact,
by the time you hold for twenty years, there is no possible time period in
which you would have lost money (nominally).77 What the data suggests
is not what was for most or even some investors but rather what it could
have meant to hold for various time periods, which would mitigate
“shorter” holding periods’ volatility.
Observation 5: The Alpha–Beta Dynamic Tends to Speed Up Time
Frames Irrationally.
The preceding discussion sets the stage for our discussion of shorttermism. Simply put, the alpha–beta dynamic tends to speed up time
irrationally.
Perhaps the focus on alpha-seeking investors’ trading could be
acceptable if there were evidence that the trading adds value. But, alpha
is, by definition, a zero-sum pursuit. Moreover, there is evidence that
investors hyper-discount—the systematic over-discounting of future cash
flows, or what Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane has
identified as the (too) “short long.”78 Hyper-discounting combined with
MPT’s incorrect view of holding periods contributes to investors
(including “long-term” ones) having irrationally short-term horizons.
Therefore, though they think of themselves as long-term investors,
sequential investors add to the economic short-termism.
Somewhat parallel with our idea that absolute-return benchmarking (or
liability benchmarking) is better than relative-return benchmarking,
Haldane writes:
Imagine instead that an investor w[as] making choices
based on average payback periods, rather than NPV.
Under rational discounting, the project has a payback
period of nine years. Under myopic discounting, the
payback period rises to 15 years. An investor might now

77. Time and Risk, CTR. RESEARCH SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/files/investments_
illustrated/BP_h_2015_crsp_us-en.pdf. [https://perma.cc/5PBU-8RSP].
78. Haldane et al., supra note 1.
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think twice before investing their money, for their money
is committed for almost twice as long.79
Haldane presents two NPV examples using ‘rational discounting’
(x=1.00), myopic (between x=0.95 and x=0.90)80:

The implications of these assumptions are stark: at an extreme, an
NPV over fifty years falls from $56 to minus $11. Haldane’s point: the
short long.81 As he notes, the market values cash flows that are five years
away as if they were eight years away, and cash flows that are thirty years
away are given no value by the market.82
Hyper-discounting is the seasoning that makes an MPT stew of shorttermism even more so. Here is the recipe: Combine the focus on alphaseeking trading as a way to differentiate a track record and the hyperdiscounting of future cash flows in those trades. Allow those hyperdiscounted trades to determine the components and weightings of indices.
Move lots of money into passive strategies that track those indices, which
are, of course, calculated based off those hyper-discounted trades. Then
emphasize tracking error against those indices so that even more money is
linked to them.
The effects impact far more than just the equity markets. They also
influence the real economy and, perhaps, dampen the inputs into
79. Id.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. at 13–24.
82. Id.
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productivity improvement, resulting in slower-than-possible economic
growth. For example, Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner argue that inclusion
in the popular Russell 2000 index causes companies to reduce long-term
investments, such as research and development spending, to accommodate
new, short-term-focused investors.83
Over-discounting of the future can have very real effects. For
example, the U.S. government uses a 3% discount rate on the social cost
of carbon, resulting in an implied cost of carbon emissions of $36 a ton.84
Decreasing the discount rate to 2.5% would hike the price to $56 a ton. By
contrast, increasing the discount rate to 5% would reduce that cost to $11
a ton. A member of the Trump environmental transition team has
suggested 7%—a rate that suggests that we may have a dead planet in a
millennium for about a dollar. 85
We suggest that the idea that the long-run is a series of short-runs is
an MPT failure, much the way that over-discounting the social cost of
carbon will result in a system failure and the end of human dominance of
the world, rather than a summation of the “normal” series of short-terms
that precede it.
To assume that the long-run is a series of short-runs—and that the
current systemic risk context will remain in place and acceptable—
assumes that people act in responsible ways for the long-run to protect the
essential systems that allow capital markets to function. Behavioral
finance and other approaches have proved this empirically false. Indeed,
MPT itself relies on arguing that idiosyncratic risk is managed via
diversification and that investing has no impact on systemic risk. In turn,
this suggests that market participants have no particular interest in either
mitigating or exacerbating—or even affecting—systemic risk in any way
at all. The inference is that systems will maintain.
The global financial crisis suggests otherwise. Numerous analyses
have suggested that a mass reduction in underwriting standards on
individual loans (idiosyncratic risk) added up to a systemic risk over
time.86 That is consistent with our view that alpha (related to idiosyncratic
83. See Cremers et al., supra note 16.
84. Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. SOC. COST
GREENHOUSE GASES, U.S. GOV’T 4 (Aug. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201612/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK6J-5JX7].
85. Chelsea Harvey, Economists Expect Fight Over Climate Change Cost, WASH. POST (Dec.
27, 2016), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20161227/281565175422654.
86. See, e.g., Laurence Wilse-Samson, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Underwriting Standards,
Loan Modifications and Securitization (Feb. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
columbia.edu/~lhw2110/Subprime_survey_Samson.pdf.
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risk) and beta (related to systemic risk) are not disjointed but rather points
along a continuum, and actions designed to affect one can affect the other.
If too few people think in terms of systems, each “short-run” period
changes the systemic risk profile for the next “short-run” period. Perhaps
this is not enough to notice if your investment horizon is six months. But,
many people invest for retirement, perhaps over fifty years, and economic
historians look at centuries. The system in which you invest for the first
six-month period is unlikely to be anything like the system in which you
invest for the 100th sixth-month period (witness the discussion of the U.S.
public equity market in Markowitz’s time versus today, above).87 We
argue that systems are somewhat path dependent, with the next evolution
of the system dependent on its current state rather than somehow mean
regressing to a normal or standard state. Put somewhat differently, the
long-term is not simply additive short-term intervals, each of which is
unrelated to the previous and the next. Rather, it is the linkages of various
past and current events to future ones; for example, post-financial crisis
discussions of tail risk clearly recognize this.88
The focus on alpha and the measures of stock trading, such as holding
periods, turnover, and duration, all fail to contemplate this dynamic.
The heterodox views expressed above beg two questions:
1. If alpha and beta are intertwined, beta is not immutable, and beta
is more impactful on wealth generation than alpha, how should
investors invest?
2. If investors effectively have permanent exposure to beta, yet they
over-discount the future of individual positions created by alphaseeking, how should they view their investment time horizon?
The answer to both questions is that investors today need to be aware
of risks and opportunities at the security level (alpha), market level (beta),
and systems level. And they are beginning to do so. But, our current
temporal measures assume that alpha-seeking is the dominant driver of
investment decisions, despite the fact that beta has more impact on
investment risk and return.

87. Markowitz, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
88. E.g., Lee Cohen et al., Bank Earnings Management and Tail Risk During the Financial
Crisis, 46 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 171 (2014); Stefan Straetmans & Sajid Chaudhry, Tail Risk
and Systemic Risk of US and Eurozone Financial Institutions in the Wake of the Global Financial
Crisis, 58 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 191 (2015); Understanding Tail Risk, PIMCO, https://www.pimco.
com/en-us/resources/education/understanding-tail-risk/ [https://perma.cc/R9NV-YGHK].
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Observation 6, and Future Directions and Questions: There Is a
Need for Better Measures of Time Frames. Those Metrics Should be
Designed for Purpose Rather than Be a “One Metric Measures All.”
Current metrics, such as holding period, stock duration, and turnover,
are adequate to measure the time horizon for stock picking and to use in
combination with other measures to suggest stock-picking skill as the key
input to what is traditionally termed “alpha.” However, acknowledging the
alpha–beta dynamic complicates the nature of the metrics needed to
measure the time horizons of investment.
Traditional temporal measures are not useful to illustrate the realities
of today’s investment world, which is some combination of alpha-seeking,
beta-matching, and alpha–beta feedback loops. For instance, holding
period is not a helpful metric in understanding the duration of a series of
sequential alpha trades resulting in quasi-permanent beta exposure. Nor do
they illuminate the specific time periods of beta exposure created by those
sequential trades that aggregate alpha-seeking trades into semi-permanent
beta exposures. A time line of beta exposure and of cash drag might be a
place to start.
An even more difficult job will be to find temporal measures relative
to the feedback loops between an investor’s, or group of investors’,
portfolio investment and the resultant effect on beta, whether that effect is
intentional or incidental. This type of question is an important element in
the work of The Investment Integration Project, among others.
Perhaps one idea to illuminate some aspects of the issue would be to
infer an investor’s discount rate. Knowing that, it would be possible to
back into the time horizon of investors not just for individual security
trades but also for actions designed to affect beta. Such an inverted,
inferred discount rate (IIDR) would have the advantage of being
comparable across alpha-seeking, beta-matching, and beta-affecting
investors and would suggest which investors or investment vehicles have
shorter or longer term investment philosophies. It might also have a
secondary, salutary effect by making discount rates explicit. If it is true
that “what gets measured gets managed,” then such a metric would be a
first step towards investors understanding, and then correcting, their
tendency to hyper-discount, and could thereby counter the current “short
long.” If combined with a dollar-weighted returns metric (as discussed
above), these metrics begin to measure today’s complex investment
strategies.
Another likely complementary starting point would be development
of multiple absolute metrics, as some factor investing strategies would
imply. Such metrics would need to have both temporal and exposure axes.
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The advantage of such metrics is that they can be temporal metrics of
exposure not to just beta but also to factors, whether E, S, and G factors,
or to more traditional factors (e.g., value, size, momentum, volatility, term,
credit, and market (beta)).89
Some or all of these new metrics likely have implications for current
law and regulations in various jurisdictions. A discussion of what these
might mean is beyond the scope of this Article, but a parallel with MPT is
apt. As MPT came to the fore in both market practice and academic theory
in the 1960s and 1970s, its impact was dramatically felt in the revisions of
U.S. law and regulation, specifically in the formulations of the 1974
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),90 which focused
on defining risk on a portfolio rather than an individual security basis.
Future work will have to confront the challenges of developing both
the concepts and practical metrics for such measurements, as well as what
the legal and regulatory implications of such metrics are. Such a
reconceptualization of metrics would not only confront the “short long”
but would directly link the role of finance to what we consider its proper
place: as an intermediary to rationally foster and facilitate non-financial
capital investment, unaffected by either the blind spots of MPT or the
tendency to hyper-discount long-term investment returns.

89. See Scott N. Pappas & Joel M. Dickson, Factor-Based Investing 8 VANGUARD (Apr. 2015),
https://www.vanguardcanada.ca/documents/factor-based-investing-research-tlrv.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4TJ4-99Q6].
90. See generally Daniel Kintzel, Portfolio Theory, Life-Cycle Investing, and Retirement Income,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. OFF. POL’Y (Oct. 2007), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/policybriefs/pb200702.html [https://perma.cc/73TA-6V6R].

